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Institutional determinants of R&D investment: Evidence from 
emerging markets 
 
Abstract: Institutional environment of a country plays an important role for innovation activities. Our results 
confirm that external environment of emerging countries influence the R&D investment. Using Generalized 
Method of Moments (GMM) estimation of panel data for 664 firms from selected 20 emerging markets during 
the period of 2006-2013, we find that institutional quality has significant impact on R&D investment. The 
results show that government effectiveness, rule of law, and regularity quality have positive impact, while 
corruption and political instability have negative impact on R&D investment in the emerging markets. We also 
performed elasticity test to compare among the institutional factors. The results show that among the 
institutional determinants, corruption of a particular emerging country is found to be most important in 
influencing R&D investment followed by regularity quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, and political 
instability. These results would be helpful to investors and policy makers to assess the requirements of 
sustainable development. The results of this study clearly demonstrate that to attract more R&D investment as a 
source of sustainable development, government should ensure a sound and stable institutional environment 
along with strengthening other firm level factors as institutional factors are more important to explain the 
variation over the time and also cost effective in terms of implementation. 
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1. Introduction 
Research and Development (R&D) investment is considered to be one of the most essential 
elements in promoting economic growth and development (Alam et al., 2017). Wang (2010) 
observed that countries with sufficient level of R&D investment can achieve target economic 
growth by promoting productivity and advancing their knowledge base. A central focus of 
innovation research is the analysis of R&D determinants (Barge-Gil and López, 2014). 
Previous research has used the Schumpeterian hypothesis and inter-industry effects to explain 
the determinants of R&D investment (Barge-Gil and López, 2014). Resource based view (Lai 
et al., 2015) and the behavioural view (Lewellyn and Bao, 2015) have also been used to 
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explain the determinants of R&D investments. However, Wang (2010) stated that 
institutional factors may also help to explain R&D investment. Better institutional 
environment may stimulate R&D activity by providing enhanced collaborative capacity to the 
firms (Wu et al., 2016).  Similarly, Srholec (2011) stated that attributes of the firm as well as 
the institutional settings within which firms operate do matter for innovation. Wang et al. 
(2015) supported this notion and indicated that R&D investment strategy, structure and 
process must be compatible with institutional demands. There are several reasons why the 
institutional environmentis considered to be most important drivers for innovative activities. 
First, as risky and long-term investment, R&D investment is affected by agency problem. 
However, improved institutions help to reduce the agency problem among decision makers 
and thereby help to increase the R&D investment (Choi et al., 2014). Second, the quality of 
institution increases the R&D investment by enabling firms to get access to various factors 
and innovation intermediaries (Wu et al., 2016). Third, good institutional quality may attract 
foreign investors (Bénassy-Quéré, 2007), helps firms to access external finance (La Porta et 
al.,1997), mitigate opaque information (Hillier et al., 2011), and provides incentives to the 
firms (Edquist and Johnson, 1997) and therefore, promotes R&D investment within the firms. 
Fourth, institutions influence the transaction cost of innovation (Wang et al., 2015). Poor 
institutions such as corruption may increase the R&D investment cost. Fifth, good 
governance such as strong intellectual property rights (IPRs) provide investors protections, 
thereby, facilitates investment in R&D (Krammer, 2015). In this regard, Ghosh and He 
(2015) stated that stronger investor protection reduces the manager’s opportunistic behaviour 
to divert cash flow to them, therefore, more resources employed to value enhancing capital 
project like R&D. Moreover, Xiao (2013) stated that legal protection to shareholders reduces 
the agency conflict and solve the under and over investment problem of R&D activities. 
Sixth, strong institutions ensure the return from uncertain investment like R&D by managing 
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risk (Edquist and Johnson, 1997) and fostering an innovation-friendly environment 
(Krammer, 2015). Finally, institutions have decisive influence on nature and extent of R&D 
investment (Hashi and Stojcic, 2013). Considering the huge importance of institutional 
factors in determining the extent of R&D investment, this paper has made an effort to explore 
the institutional determinants of R&D activities.  
Although institutional framework shapes up strategic investment decisions all around the 
world, this issue is even more critical for emerging economies. Peng et al. (2008) and Meyer 
et al. (2009) pointed out that institutional framework is more sensitive to firms’ investment 
decisions and performance in emerging economies. Peng et al. (2008) suggested that 
institutional condition in emerging economies constitute the third leg of strategy tripod along 
with industry and firm level condition to shape up organisational strategy and performance. 
Therefore, R&D investment as an important part of overall firm strategic investment should 
consider institutional condition. R&D investment is growing faster in emerging economies in 
recent years. Li and Kozhikode (2009) stated that global R&D landscape is changing very 
fast and emerging markets are attracting more attention from multinational companies 
(MNCs) as a location for increased level of R&D investment due to higher demand, lower 
cost and increased level of technology adoption. Logue (2011) stated that the rate of return 
from the same investment is higher in emerging markets than in developed ones. Emerging 
countries are considered as land of profitable opportunities to the foreign investors (Phylaktis, 
2009). As a result, in recent years, MNCs are establishing large number of R&D centres in 
emerging markets (Patra and Krishna, 2015). Kafouros and Aliyev (2016) stated that better 
institutional settings offer competitive advantages to the firms by reducing transaction costs 
and increasing the convenience of contract enforcement process. Accordingly, emerging 
economies are constantly improving their institutional quality (OECD, 2011; Kafouros and 
Aliyev, 2016). Therefore, it would be interesting to see if the institutional environment in the 
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emerging countries has any impact of R&D investment. Although institutions have been 
identified as a core determinant of investment in general and R&D investment in particular, 
there is a lack of research examining the relationship between institutional factors and R&D 
investment. The paper is motivated by the findings from Wang (2010) and Pattit et al. (2012) 
who pointed out that institutional factors may better explain the R&D activities and also from 
the observation by Barge-Gil and López (2014), who pointed out the omission of important 
factors that determine the R&D activities.Moreover, Choi et al. (2014) stated that firms in 
emerging markets are trying to become more competitive by relying on innovation more than 
any other business strategy. However, Choi et al. (2014) pointed out that there is very limited 
evidence available on how institutions may have effect on innovation activities by emerging 
market firms.  The use of institutional theory in explaining the R&D investment is more 
appropriate than using other firm level theory. For example, Pattit et al. (2012) mentioned 
that institutional theory helps to explain the larger aggregate trends from period to period 
whereas firm-level theories only explains some variance within the period. 
This paper contributes to the literature in several ways. First, we investigate the institutional 
determinants of R&D spending for 3973 firm-year observations from selected 20 emerging 
markets during the period of 2006-2013. The earlier researchers have emphasized on single 
factors such as legal institutions (Anderlini et al., 2013; Seitz and Watzinger, 2017); political 
instability and education system (Varsakelis, 2006); government effectiveness (Dolfsma and 
Seo, 2013); regulations (Blind, 2012; Blind et al., 2017). Therefore, these studies are not 
sufficient to understand the impact of institutional factors on R&D investment from the 
context of emerging markets. To fill this gap, this paper has taken a holistic approach and 
considers various aspects of institutions and attempt to identify the social, legal and political 
institutional determinants of R&D investment from the context of emerging markets. By 
doing this, the study provides significant insights into the importance of external 
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environments, in particular institutional settings for R&D investment in the emerging 
markets. This is important as Mahmood et al. (2012) pointed out that innovation is mostly 
influenced by the interaction between firm and its external environment. Second, unlike 
earlier research on institutional determinants of R&D investment, this paper has taken a 
holistic approach and used a large set of institutional factors to examine their influence on 
R&D intensity. This has given the opportunity to examine the relative importance of those 
factors in affecting R&D investment. This paper has calculated elasticity of each institutional 
determinant to identify the relative importance. Finally, exploring the institutional 
determinants of R&D investment in emerging markets is important. Returns from R&D 
investment in the emerging countries are higher than those of advanced countries (Lederman 
and Maloney, 2003) and therefore attract more investments in R&D. However, lack of 
knowledge on institutional determinants in those countries might put investors at risk. Peng et 
al. (2008) also emphasised on further research in the area of institutional condition of 
emerging markets as this would benefit both the home country managers and managers of 
firms from abroad that are willing to enter into the emerging market as part of their expansion 
strategy. 
The paper is organized as follows: the next section presents a brief theoretical discussion and 
develops the hypotheses. Section three introduces the data and research method. Section four 
presents result and discussions. The last section concludes the study and highlights some 
policy implications of the study. 
2. Theory and Hypotheses 
Institutional theory posits that institutional settings of a country facilitates investment by 
providing incentives and supports, creating a stable environment, mitigating transaction costs, 
reducing risk and uncertainty. North (1990) and Daude and Stein (2007) pointed out that 
investment decision may depend on different dimensions of institutional environment. R&D 
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activities as a form of investment is also sensitive to institutional quality (Waarden, 2001). In 
this regard, Varsakelis (2006) and Krammer (2009) stated that investment in education, 
strong legal protection, stable political and economic situation are positively related with 
technological performance. Pattit et al. (2012) found evidence in support of the influence of 
institutions on technological development in the US since the mid-19
th
 century. Both the 
formal and informal institutions played a dominant role in shaping up the US technological 
change over a considerably longer period of time. Wang et al. (2015) mentioned that 
innovation activities of firm can be influenced by institutions through laws, regulations and 
policies. It has been mentioned further that institutions influence the cost of innovation inputs 
and also protects the innovation outputs and thereby influence the firms’ innovation 
activities. Choi et al. (2014) pointed out that effective institutions can encourage the R&D 
investments by minimising the agency problem among the decision makers. Better 
institutions promote financial market liberalisation which in effect encourages R&D 
investment by reducing financial constraints of the firms (Laeven, 2003). Therefore, it is 
highly likely that stronger institutional settings help to foster R&D investment and improve 
knowledge accumulation and knowledge spillover in a country. These tend to confirm the 
notion that firms’ innovation capabilities depend on institutional settings (Priem and Butler, 
2001; Yi et al., 2013). 
 
There may be huge disparities in features of institutions. According to Krammer (2015), “In 
practice, measuring institutions is a daunting task”. In this regard, Mahendra et al. (2015) 
stated that it is difficult to measure institutional variables as each country and region may 
have different understanding and perceptions on what institutions are. Dunning (2006) has 
also pointed out the differences in country level institutional variables. Country level 
institutions have impact on firm strategy (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Pindado et al. (2015) 
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found evidence that country level institutions strongly affect the market valuation of the firm 
R&D investment. Among the country level factors, financial system, education system, 
public policy and training system are important institutional factors for national innovation 
systems (Freeman, 1987; Dosi et al., 1990; Lundvall, 1992). In this paper, we have used 
institutional variables based on the suggestions by Kaufmann et al. (2009) and Krammer 
(2015). These are government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, political system and 
regularity quality. Although, institutional setting of a country may also include various other 
cognitive and normative elements as suggested by North (1990), the selected variables are 
more tangible than others. 
 
Government effectiveness has an impact on firm performance through its effect on 
managerial assumption and actions (Pearce et al.,2011), therefore, it reduces the agency cost. 
The lower agency cost increases the likelihood of efficient investment. Moreover, an 
effective government makes investors to feel confident and safeguards future returns from 
investment. In a relevant study, Jiao et al. (2015) pointed out that fiscal policies set out by the 
government provides internal incentives to the firm and promote entrepreneurial activities. 
Effective government encourages private and public firms to engage in R&D investment. For 
example, Singapore government promotes R&D investment in both private and public firms 
by arranging training for R&D manpower and attracting foreign investors (Tsang et al., 
2008). In an empirical study, Mahmood and Rufin (2005) stated that active role of 
government accelerates the technological innovation through spillover effect and by creating 
networks between firms and individuals. Moreover, greater government capacity may 
promote R&D investment by providing greater support, budgets and subsidies for creative 
and innovative activities. In a recent paper, Szczygielski et al. (2017) found evidence that 
efficiency of government efforts seems to contribute to better innovation performance by 
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firms in emerging markets such as Turkey and Poland. As the role of government tends to be 
much more influential in emerging markets (Hong et al., 2015), this study is proposing the 
following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: There will be a positive relationship between Government effectiveness and 
R&D investment. 
Rule of law measures the judicial strength of a country (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003) and 
ensures strict enforcement of law. Rule of law or a strong legal system seems to be important 
in encouraging R&D investment (Seitz and Watzinger, 2017). La Porta et al. (1997) provided 
evidence that strong rule of law helps to develop financial market and therefore help to 
support R&D investment. A developed and liquid financial market ensures access to capital 
at a lower cost and reduces information asymmetry. Moreover, strong rule of law helps to 
reduce managerial expropriation, protects patent right and ensures contract enforcement 
(Seitz and Watzinger, 2017). All these benefits arising out of strong rule of law help to 
increase R&D investment by reducing the riskiness of the same. Acharya and Subramanian 
(2009) stated that creditors’ right and employee right also help to encourage R&D. The 
authors have argued that strong creditors’ right helps protect the creditors from bankruptcy 
fear and encourage more investment in R&D. Similarly, employee right helps to encourage 
employees to devote more time to innovation activities despite the possibility of failure at the 
end. Seitz and Watzinger (2017) have shown that the higher R&D investment in Germany 
compared to Italy is due to its superior rule of law and strict contract enforcement. Moreover, 
Pindado et al. (2015) confirm that strong legal system enhances R&D by improving 
investors’ protection and confidence. Similarly, using institutional theory, Furukawa (2007) 
confirmed that stronger rule of law provide strong protection of patent rights and investment 
incentives that motivate the investors in R&D activity. However, in some cases, tight laws 
may discourage innovative activities. The basic argument is that strict law would increase the 
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compliance cost and therefore, firms feel discouraged to raise external capital which in turn 
reduces the corporate investment such as R&D investment (Blind, 2012). On the other hand, 
Waarden (2001) stated that de-regulation may encourage innovation as it provides more 
freedom to innovate and concluded that the relationship between law and innovation is not 
straightforward. Although, evidence on the relationship between rule of law and R&D 
activities has been found to be positive or complicated in some cases, we still do not have 
enough evidence for emerging markets as most of those studies are based on developed 
markets. However, in a recent paper, Jiao et al. (2015) found a positive relation between legal 
environment and innovation based on an emerging market. Thus, following Jiao et al. (2015), 
this study is proposing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Rule of law and R&D investment are positively correlated. 
Corruption, as an institutional void, profoundly influence the level of R&D investment. 
Rodriguez et al. (2005) defined corruption as abuse of public power for private benefit. 
Anokhin and Schulze (2009) argued that corruption undermines the foundation of 
institutional trust that is essential for investment in innovative activities. Corruption increases 
the cost of investment, as investors need to pay bribes to the officials to obtain the permits 
and licenses (Daude and Stein, 2007). Romer (1994) added that by increasing the cost of 
fixed investment, corruption reduce the entry of new goods and technology. Moreover, it is 
highly likely that corruption makes the project uncertain and less profitable. Consequently, 
both local and foreign investors become demotivated to long-term and costly investment like 
R&D. Thus, Anokhin and Schulze (2009) stated that corruption hinders the productivity, 
entrepreneurship, and investment in R&D. The authors have argued that corruption increases 
agency and transaction costs, limits revenues and erodes the potential value of the returns of 
the opportunity. In a similar vein, Javorcik and Wei (2009) stated that high level of 
corruption increases information asymmetry and cost of doing business. Therefore, it is 
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highly likely that in the presence of corruption, R&D investment becomes riskier and return 
from R&D investment would be lower. Therefore, firms in countries with high level of 
corruption would find it discouraging to make investment in innovation activities. As 
corruption remain major problems of doing business and innovation for most of the emerging 
countries (IFC, 2002), this study is proposing the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of corruption negatively affects the level of R&D investment. 
Political condition of any country has significant impact on corporate investment. Political 
stability is conducive to favourable investment environment as stability ensures continuation 
of economic policies and reduction of future uncertainty. R&D investment as a form of 
corporate investment is also influenced by political condition. R&D investment is long term 
and risky in nature. Therefore, any instability in political condition will affect R&D more 
than other forms of corporate investments. Masino (2015) pointed out that in an uncertain and 
volatile economy, firms tend to reduce the level of investment in innovative activities. 
Atanassov et al. (2016) argued that uncertainty increases the value of option to wait before 
making investments. The authors have pointed out that R&D investment is most appropriate 
example of investment with extreme irreversibility and high adjustment cost. Therefore, in 
the face of any uncertainty, option to wait would be more valuable than investing in R&D 
amid high uncertainty. This will eventually lead to lower R&D investment when economy 
becomes volatile and faces high uncertainty. Political instability is the major cause of 
economic uncertainty as suggested by Mobarak (2005) and Klomp and Haan (2009). Politics 
influence the shape of government policy to stimulate investment in the short-run and 
formulate economic and regulatory policy in the long run (Julio and Yook, 2012). Instability 
in the political condition gives rise to the possibility of frequent changes or cancellation of 
those short and long run policies and creates economic uncertainty and therefore affect the 
R&D investment. A number of authors have found that political instability negatively affects 
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the level of R&D investment including Henisz (2002), Allard et al. (2012), and Masino 
(2015). As the volatility and uncertainty caused by political uncertainty are significantly 
higher in emerging markets as suggested by Easterly et al. (2000) and Klomp and Haan 
(2009), this study is proposing following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 4: R&D investment is negatively related to political instability. 
Jalilian et al. (2007) pointed out that effective regulations help to achieve social objectives set 
by governments for regulatory authorities, enabling social goals to be achieved at minimum 
cost. On the other hand, inefficient and inconsistent government regulations lead to 
uncertainly for investors as it raises the investment cost (Parker, 1999). Good regulatory 
quality helps firms with market entry and keeping up-to-date with developments. Moreover, 
good quality of regulations increases the investment opportunities of a country. In this 
regards, Kirkpatrick et al. (2006) concluded that the quality of regulatory framework and 
foreign investment is highly related. They also observed that due to weak government 
regulations foreign investors may reluctant to investment in the large investment projects like 
R&D. Similarly, Mahendra et al. (2015) found evidence that good regulatory quality and 
access to finance have positive impact on innovation. Although, Blind et al. (2017) stated that 
the relation between regulations and innovation may differ due to market environments, they 
found that regulations have positive influence on innovation in low uncertain markets while 
opposite effects in high uncertain markets.  Thus, due to the variation in quality of regulations 
and market environments among the emerging countries, the relation may vary. However, as 
emerging markets are improving the quality of government regulations, the following 
hypothesis is postulated: 
Hypothesis 5: Regularity Quality is positively correlated with R&D Investment. 
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In addition to the above, other factors also affect firms’ R&D investment. Scott (1995) and 
Oliver (1997) stated that strategic choices such as R&D spending are driven by institutional 
frameworks, along with industry conditions and firm-specific resources. Firm size (Lall, 
1983), cash flow (Bhagat and Welch, 1995), debt ratio (Hall, 1992) and GDP growth (Wang, 
2010) are among those important variables that may affect R&D investment decisions. Larger 
firms tend to be more diversified, more technologically complex and better aware of 
technological opportunities (Lall, 1983). Pecking order theory and internal fund theory argue 
that financial status, measured by the cash flow of a firm, determines the level of investment. 
Bhagat and Welch (1995) noted that R&D occurs mostly when firms have more operating 
cash flows on hand and are thus able to avoid the costs of external capital markets. According 
to Hall (1992), external finance, and specifically debt, is not favoured as a form of finance for 
R&D investment, as debt servicing usually requires a stable source of cash flow, which 
makes it more difficult to find funds for R&D investment. Increased GDP growth seems to be 
allocated to increased investment in R&D. Wang (2010) pointed out that GDP growth creates 
stronger incentives for R&D investment. 
3. Methodology 
3.1 Data 
 
To test the hypothesis, data were collected from several sources, including DataStream, 
World Bank’s Development Indicators (WDI) and Worldwide Governance Indictor (WGI), 
World Bank. Firm level data such as R&D expenditure, sales, total assets, total debt, cash 
flow, and industry type were drawn from the DataStream. GDP growth data were obtained 
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from WDI. Data on institutional factors, measuring government effectiveness, regularity 
quality, rule of law, corruption, and political stability were obtained from WGI
1
, World Bank. 
The eight-year sample period of the study was from 2006 to 2013. The post-reform period of 
R&D reporting was considered so that the sample firms would treat R&D expenditure 
homogeneously. Moreover, gaps in the latest data were minimised where possible. We 
applied several sample selection criteria. First, in order to be included in the sample, firms 
must have at least five consecutive years of data between 2006 and 2013 to control the short 
panel bias (see Flannery and Hankins, 2013). Moreover, this requirement is necessary to test 
the assumption of generalized method of moments (GMM) estimation on the absence of 
second order auto-correlation AR(2) (Pindado et al., 2017). Second, Hong Kong, Singapore, 
South Korea and Taiwan were excluded, as these countries are now considered as emerged 
economies. Third, following Pindado et al. (2015), financial firms were also excluded due to 
their different corporate structure and strategy. After dropping missing values and unrealistic 
figures (such as negative values of R&D expenditure), the sample consisted of 664 firms 
from 20 emerging countries
2
 (See Table 1). Several sources of data and in particular, missing 
values lead to unbalanced panel data. In a relevant study, Hillier et al. (2011) states that 
unbalanced panel data could control the survivorship bias problem. 
Table 1: Sample by Country3 
Country Frequency Composition                
(%) 
Country Frequency Composition                
(%) 
                                                 
1Data on institutional variables are accessed from WGI, World Bank and produced by Kaufmann and Kraay. Please refer to 
the following website: (http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home). 
 
2
 The list of emerging markets may vary from one organisation to another. To avoid this problem, all emerging markets from 
all organisations’ lists (IMF, Goldman Sachs, FTSE, MSCI, The Economist, S&P, Dow Jones, BBVA and Columbia 
University EMGP - 2013) were selected for this study. 
 
3 To mitigate the potential bias from the dominant country in the sample, we ran separate regression except India which is 
consists of 41.27% of sample. We find similar results of main regression. This implies that although India has dominating 
sample, it has same behavioural characterises like other emerging markets. The results will provide upon request. The 
unobserved heterogeneity of the countries such as Bangladesh, Greece, Israel, & Pakistan can be controlled by applying 
generalized method of moments of panel data. 
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Bangladesh 2 0.301 Malaysia 34 5.120 
Brazil 9 1.355 Pakistan 12 1.807 
Chile 2 0.301 Philippine 11 1.657 
China 60 9.036 Poland 4 0.602 
Egypt 2 0.301 Romania 1 0.151 
Greece 37 5.572 Russia 12 1.807 
India 274 41.27 Saudi Arabia 2 0.301 
Indonesia 17 2.560 South Africa 28 4.217 
Israel 59 8.886 Sri Lanka 6 0.904 
Jordan 5 0.753 Turkey 87 13.102 
Source: Author’s calculation 
 
     
Table- 2 displays the definition of the variables. All variables are standardized to a common 
USD exchange rate. Some of the explanatory variables have higher scales than others and 
high absolute value of the variables increases the heteroscedasticity presence (Grabowski, 
1968). In order to avoid these problems natural logarithm, ratio and percentage of the 
variables were used. Government effectiveness, rule of law, control of corruption, political 
instability, and regulatory quality are considered as institutional variables following 
Kaufmann et al. (2009; 2010) and Krammer (2015). The indices range from -2.5 to 2.5 
(approximately), with higher values indicating stronger institutions. These indices are based 
on over 30 different data sources produced by a variety of survey institutions, think tanks, 
non-governmental organizations, international organizations and private sector firms 
(Kaufmann et al., 2010). They applied statistical tool known as unobserved components 
model (UCM) to combine the many individual data sources into aggregate indicators. 
Although these variables are measured as aggregate value, they are time variant as financial 
data. 
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Table 2: Definitions of Variables 
 
Variables Variable definitions (measurement) 
 
Sources 
R&D intensity R&D expenditure over sales  
 
DataStream 
Government effectiveness Measures of competency or capacity of the government. 
 
World Bank (WGI) 
Rule of law Measures the judicial strength 
 
World Bank (WGI) 
Corruption Measures the misuse of power 
 
World Bank (WGI) 
Political instability Measures the likelihood of political instability 
 
World Bank (WGI) 
Regularity quality Captures the ability of the government to promote development 
 
World Bank (WGI) 
Firm size Firm size is measured by total asset  
 
DataStream 
Cash flow The ratio of cash flows to sales 
 
DataStream 
Debt ratio The ratio of total debt over total assets 
 
DataStream 
GDP growth Annual GDP growth of a country 
 
World Bank (WDI) 
Industry type The Industry takes value 1 if it is technology intensive; 0 otherwise4 
 
DataStream 
 
                                                 
4
 OECD two-digits SIC codes: 28,35,36,37,38,48,73 and 87 were considered as technology intensive industry 
following Kallunki et al. (2009). 
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Table-3 presents descriptive statistics for the variables. Government effectiveness has a mean 
of 0.23220 and a range of -0.89306 (for Egypt) and 1.36792 (for Israel). This implies that 
Israel has effective government while Egypt has poor government effectiveness. Rule of law 
has a mean of 0.06717 and a range between -0.97680 (for Pakistan) and 1.36679 (for Chile) 
which indicates that Chile has stronger rule of law while Pakistan has poor legal system. The 
mean value (negative) of corruption is -0.21205 which indicates that emerging countries still 
suffer from a lack of control of corruption. The minimum value (-1.42297) corresponds to 
Bangladesh which indicates poor control of corruption and maximum value (1.56205) 
corresponds to Chile which implies strong control of corruption. In terms of regularity 
quality, Chile (1.54042) has stronger regularity quality while Bangladesh (-0.96320) has 
poorer that than others. Political instability has a mean of -0.91154 and a politically instable 
country is Pakistan (-2.81208) while politically stable country is Poland (1.05695). The 
results show that some emerging countries have stronger institutional settings than others. For 
example, Chile has stronger rule of law, lesser corruption and good regularity quality while 
Israel has effective government and Poland has stable political condition. On the other hand, 
Egypt has weaker government effectiveness and Pakistan has greater political instability, and 
Bangladesh has poorer regularity quality and higher levels of corruption than any other 
emerging countries. These show that institutional factors such as government effectiveness, 
rule of law, corruption, political instability and regulatory quality vary among emerging 
markets. 
 
Among the control variables, firm size has a mean of 5.38384 and a range of 3.26553 (for Sri 
Lanka) and 8.64330 (for Russia). Firm size varies among emerging countries because some, 
such as Brazil, Russia, India and China (BRIC), have more MNCs than others. The mean 
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value of cash flows is9.94017 and a highest value correspond to 122.0180 (for Turkey) and 
lowest value corresponds to -685.430 (for India). GDP growth has a mean of 5.54712 and a 
range between -8.87000 (for Greece) and 14.1600 (for China). These results indicate that 
cash flows and GDP growth also vary among emerging markets. This is because the impact 
of the recent global financial crisis 2007-2010 was not the same for all countries and firms. 
Moreover, EURO crisis could cause this variation among the emerging countries during the 
observed period. Industry dummy has a mean of 0.62973 which indicates that 62.97% of the 
sample is from technology intensive industry. Tabrizi (2005) points out that technology 
intensive industry spend more on R&D than others. In general, technology-based firms place 
more weight on bringing new knowledge to the markets, advancing technology, and 
increasing employee skills, internal competencies and capabilities. These results support 
considering control of the industry effect in the model. 
Table 3: Summary Statistics 
 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation Minimum Maximum 
R&D intensity 0.00750 0.01889 0.00000 0.25229 
Government effectiveness 0.23220 0.47705 -0.89306 1.36792 
Rule  of law 0.06717 0.41920 -0.97680 1.36679 
Corruption -0.21205 0.45953 -1.42297 1.56205 
Political stability -0.91154 0.56635 -2.81208 1.05695 
Regularity quality 0.05404 0.52521 -0.96320 1.54042 
Firm size 5.38384 0.85824 3.26553 8.64330 
Cash flow 9.94017 19.30518 -685.430 122.180 
Debt ratio 0.25180 0.18132 0.00000 0.88221 
GDP growth 5.54712 3.97904 -8.87000 14.1600 
Industry dummy 0.62973 0.48293 0.00000 1.00000 
Source: Author's Calculation 
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3.2 Model 
 
In order to examine the institutional determinants of R&D expenditure, the following model 
was devised. 
ln(R&DIntensityit) = αi + β1(R&DIntensity ) + β2(GovernmentEffectivenessit) + β3(RuleofLawit) +β4(Corruptionit) + 
β5(PoliticalInstabilityit) +  β (RegulatoryQualityit) + β*(ControlVariablesit) + ƞi + dt + Ii + vit                                                       (1) 
 
where subscript i represents the firm and t represents the year. R&D intensity is considered as 
a dependent variable which, following Xiao (2013), takes the natural logarithm of one plus 
annual R&D expenditure over sales. The main independent variables are government 
effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, political instability and regulatory quality. Firm, 
industry and macroeconomic variables are controlled, such as firm size, cash flow, debt ratio, 
industry dummy and GDP growth. The error component εit is separated into four sub-
components: εit = ηi+ dt+ Ii + vit. ηi is considered as an individual effect to control for 
individual heterogeneity, which is then eliminated by taking first differences. In addition, the 
time dummy, denoted by dt, captures the time-specific effect to control for macroeconomic 
variables. As the industries are separated into technology and non-technology intensive, 
industry dummy Ii is included to capture industry-specific effects. Moreover, vit is considered 
as a random disturbance term, which is assumed to be i.i.d normal. 
 
3.3 Method 
 
In order to examine the institutional determinants of R&D spending in emerging countries, a 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimation was performed, following Hiller et al. 
(2011). This study used a GMM approach for several reasons. First, GMM approach is 
consistent with the panel data structure and it is efficient when less time periods (T equals 8) 
1, ti
6
19 
 
and more cross sections (N equals 664) (Asongu et al., 2018). Second, it was used to control 
for the endogeneity problem (Hillier et al., 2011). Some explanatory variables in the model 
are endogenous, which may create a problem of endogeneity. For example, firm size and 
R&D investment causality may run in both directions-from firm size to R&D investment and 
vice versa. Firm size may impact on R&D investment as greater availability of resources may 
encourage managers to commence new R&D activities (Pindado et al., 2015). On the other 
hand, investment in R&D activities increase firm performance by increasing the quality as 
well as quantity of the product that are produced and sold, which results in expand the firm 
operation. Endogeneity problem may also arise due to omitted variable bias and measurement 
errors (Teixeira and Queirós, 2016). Third, strategic investments such as R&D follow the 
path-dependent hypothesis (Garcia-Quevedo et al., 2014), and cumulativeness of information 
and knowledge implies that the current year’s R&D investment follows that of the previous 
year. Therefore, use of lagged values of dependent variables as instruments may produce 
biased results. However, GMM estimations control for lagged values of the dependent 
variable (David et al., 2006). Fourth, both heteroscedasticity and auto-correlation problems 
can be addressed by GMM estimations (David et al., 2006). Heteroscedasticity may arise 
because different countries in the sample have different characteristics, thus the residuals are 
unlikely to be constant across observations. Using the lag of dependent variables may create 
auto-correlation problems. Fifth, according to Hansen (1982), GMM estimations provide a 
general framework within which to take into account issues of statistical inference, as they 
encompass many estimators of interest to econometrics. In this regard, Worrall (2008) stated 
that, within a single framework, GMM nests several estimations, such as OLS, 2SLS and IV. 
Finally, previous researchers (e.g. Hillier et al., 2011; Pindado et al., 2015; Asongu et al., 
2018) also have applied GMM estimation to similar research. 
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There are two forms of GMM estimation: system GMM and difference GMM. As our panels 
are unbalanced, it is better to use system GMM and avoid difference GMM, which has 
weakness of magnifying gaps (Roodman, 2009; Uddin et al., 2017). Moreover, panel unit 
root tests leads us to choose system GMM as both sets of moment conditions (first difference 
and level equation) were considered. Table 4 presents the panel unit root tests. Among the 
existing number of methods such as Levin-Lin-Chu (LLC) tests, Harris-Tsavalis tests, 
Breitung tests, and Fisher-type tests, later unit root tests based on augmented dickey-fuller 
(ADF) were chosen as it allows unbalanced panel data. The null hypothesis of Fisher-type 
test is that panels contain unit roots (i. e. the variables are non-stationary). The results shows 
that R&D intensity, rule of law, regularity quality, size, cash flow, and GDP growth are 
stationary at level while after first-order differencing government effectiveness, corruption 
and political instability become stationary. The results confirmed that variables in our model 
are stationary which also hold the assumption of system GMM. Lee and Azali (2010) and 
Perera and Lee (2013) pointed that if not all variables are stationary in the levels equations as 
in our case, the difference GMM would not be efficient. Moreover, Binder et al. (2005) and 
Ulku (2005) stated that unlike difference GMM, system GMM estimators continue to be 
consistent even the variables are non-stationary. 
Table 4: Panel unit root tests 
  Level First difference 
R&D intensity 68.9632*** 
 
Government effectiveness -12.9183 16.2070*** 
Rule of law 2.9366** 
 
Corruption -2.4997 162.3577*** 
Political instability -1.1905 170.0380*** 
Regularity quality 7.6808*** 
 
Firm size 94.2419*** 
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Cash flow 58.9561*** 
 
Debt ratio 64.5426*** 
 
GDP growth 205.2582***   
Notes: All panel unit root tests were performed with intercept and trend for all variables.                 
Level of significant: * < .10,  ** < .05,  ***< .01 
 
 In comparison to other estimations such as difference GMM, ordinary least square (OLS), 
and within-groups estimator, system GMM provides efficient and consistent estimation. 
System GMM has been found to be more efficient than difference GMM (Blundell and Bond, 
1998), while difference GMM estimation has a problem of weak instruments (Alonso-
Borrego and Arellano, 1999). Due to weak instruments, difference estimator coefficient on 
lagged dependent variable are biased downward (Bond et al., 2001; Hillier et al., 2011). In a 
similar vein, OLS estimates of the coefficient on lagged dependent variable are biased 
upward as it does not control for unobserved heterogeneity (Hsiao, 1986; Hillier et al., 2011) 
while within-groups estimates of the coefficient on lagged dependent variable are biased 
downward as it does not control for endogeneity problem (Nickell, 1981; Hillier et al., 2011).  
The reliability and consistency of the system GMM estimation depends on the validity of the 
instruments. We applied several tests for the validity of our instruments. The first test is the 
Hansen J statistic of over-identifying restrictions, which test the overall validity of the 
instruments. Hansen J test results show that the instruments are valid in the model. The 
second test is the difference-in-Hansen test of exogeneity, which shows that the subset of 
instruments was used for the equations in levels is exogenous. The third test is that second-
order autocorrelation AR(2) in the first difference residuals unable to reject the null 
hypothesis suggests the presence of no autocorrelation. The fourth is that the number of 
instruments should not be higher than the number of groups (Tsekouras et al., 2016). In this 
case, the test results show that the number of instruments is far lower than the number of 
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groups. These results provide confidence that the instruments used are strong enough for 
GMM estimation. 
Two Wald tests were also used to examine whether the independent variables are jointly 
equal to zero: z1 is a test of the joint significance of the regressors, and z2 is a test of the joint 
significance of the time dummies, suggesting that aggregate factors exert a significant 
influence on the relationship between R&D investment and the explanatory variables. The 
two Wald tests provided satisfactory results for the model. Moreover, to fix the possible 
downward bias of standard errors, the Windmeijer (2005) finite-sample corrected two-step 
covariance matrix was applied. 
 
4. Results & Discussion 
The Table 5 presents the empirical results of the GMM estimation. In line with the 
expectation, government effectiveness, rule of law, corruption, political instability, and 
regularity quality has significant impact on R&D expenditure in the emerging countries. 
Thus, the results support the institutional based view. Moreover, the results show that firm 
size, debt ratio and cash flow also influence R&D investment considerably. The results 
clearly show that R&D investment is not only sensitive to internal factors but also adequately 
sensitive to institutional environment such as social, legal and political factors. In a recent 
study, Cui et al. (2016) also reached at similar findings based on data from emerging 
economies such as Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa (BRICS) and concluded 
that institutional settings have significant impact on firm’s technological innovation. 
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 Table 5: Results Summary - GMM Estimation 
R&D intensity  0.70499*** 
 
(0.07815) 
Government effectiveness 0.00153* 
 
(0.00088) 
Rule of law 0.00140* 
 
(0.00074) 
Corruption -0.00213* 
 
(0.00110) 
Political instability -0.00096** 
 
(0.00037) 
Regularity quality 0.00175* 
1t
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(0.00105) 
Size 0.00062* 
 
(0.00032) 
Cash flow -0.00015*** 
 
(0.00003) 
Cash flow  0.00008* 
 (0.00004) 
Debt ratio -0.00290** 
 
(0.00143) 
GDP growth 0.00003 
 
(0.00004) 
Industry dummies Yes 
Year dummies Yes 
   
Total observations 
 
3938 
Number of groups 664 
Number of instruments 218 
AR(1) -2.73 
P-value 0.006 
AR(2) 0.51 
P-value 0.611 
z  69.99(12) 
P-value 0.0000 
z  1.84(5) 
P-value 0.091 
Hansen J test 244.48(197) 
P- value 0.102 
  Diff-in-Hansen 123.03(62) 
P-value 0.118 
Standard errors in parenthesis. Level of significant: * < .10,  ** < .05,  ***< .01 
It is evident from Table 5 that lagged value of the dependent variable is significantly different 
from zero, showing the persistency of R&D investment. Persistence rate of 70.50 percentages 
suggests that firms follow a stable R&D policy in the emerging markets. García‐Quevedo et 
al. (2014) reached to the same conclusion based on path-dependent hypothesis. The study has 
found that government effectiveness has positive influences on R&D investment in the 
selected emerging countries. A change in government effectiveness by one unit is associated 
with a 0.15 percentage change in firms’ R&D expenditure. It is evident from our result that 
effective government creates favourable environment for R&D investment of a country by 
facilitating access to finance and easy market entry, by attracting more investment and in 
1t
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particular by accelerating technological investment. Jiao et al. (2015) also suggested the same 
and stated that firms perform better in innovation when government effectiveness is higher 
than firms without such an environment. Thus, the results support the hypothesis 1. The study 
has also found a significant positive relation between legal system and R&D investment 
among the selected countries. With a one-unit change in legal system, the likelihood of R&D 
investment increases by 0.14 percent. This implies that strong legal systems attract investors 
and increase investor confidence in R&D. In this regard, Jiao et al. (2015) added that a good 
legal environment not only increases firms’ R&D investment but also improves the efficiency 
of technological innovation, which increases the number of patent applications. Similar to our 
finding, Hiller et al. (2011), Jiao et al. (2015), and Seitz and Watzinger (2017) also concluded 
that strong legal system encourages R&D investment. Therefore, this result supports the 
hypothesis 2.  
 
This study has found a negative relationship between R&D investment and corruption among 
the selected countries. With one-unit change in corruption, there is a probability of R&D 
expenditure decreasing by 0.21 percent. Mahagaonkar (2008) also found the negative relation 
between corruption and innovation. This is because corruption increase the investment cost 
and discourages the foreign investors. The results support the hypothesis 3. This study also 
found a significant negative relationship between political instability and R&D investment. 
Political environment significantly explains the R&D investment by affecting uncertainty and 
cost associated with R&D investment. It has been found that one-unit deterioration in 
political condition decreases R&D expenditure by 0.10 percent. Allard et al. (2012) obtained 
similar results. The results support the hypothesis 4.  Regulatory quality has been found to be 
another significant determinants of R&D investment in selected emerging countries. The 
study has found a significant positive relation between regulatory quality and R&D 
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investment. More specifically, the study has found that one-unit change in regulatory 
standard increases R&D investment by 0.18 percent. This implies that high quality of 
government regulations ensure stable and consistent R&D investment. Blind et al. (2017) also 
reached at similar conclusion. The results support the hypothesis 5. 
 
Firm size has a significant positive impact on R&D investment. Larger firms will have better 
access to financial market and therefore less constrained to get required funds for making 
R&D investments. Moreover, due to wider scope of diversification by the larger firms, 
internal financing source tend to be rich for larger firms. As a result, larger firms make more 
R&D investments compared to the smaller firms. This study has found a strong positive 
relationship between firm size and R&D investment which is consistent with earlier findings 
such as Fishman and Rob (1999), Tsai and Wang (2004) and Lai et al. (2015).  The study has 
also found a negative relation between debt and R&D investment. R&D projects are 
uncertain in nature with high degree of information asymmetry. These projects are also 
characterised by lack of collateral. As a result, it is quite difficult to finance these projects 
with debt. Our result is consistent with earlier findings such as Hall (1992), Hall (2002), 
Hottenrott and Peters (2012), and Lin et al. (2017).  
This study has found a negative relation between current year cash flow and R&D investment 
which is different from some of the earlier studies such as Hall (1992), Himmelberg and 
Petersen (1994), Brown and Petersen (2009), Brown et al. (2009), Hottenrott and Peters, 
(2012), and Sasidharan et al., (2015). Despite these positive R&D-cash flow evidences, a 
negative relation is not very unusual. For example, Bhagat and Welch (1995), Seifert and 
Gonenc (2012), Li et al. (2015) and Podolski (2016) have found negative relationship 
between cash flow and R&D investment. One of the reasons for these differences in results 
could be due to the selection of different periods of time for testing the hypotheses or 
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variations in model specifications employed for the analysis. For instance, Rapp and Udoieva 
(p.28, 2016) used different estimations such as OLS, Tobit, Heckman 1
st 
Step, Heckman 2
nd
 
Step, and System GMM and found different relationship between cash flow and R&D 
investment for the same sample. In addition, the negative relation can be an outcome of 
pecking order of the use of cash flow as suggested by Dasgupta et al. (2012). The authors 
have pointed out that any immediate increase in cash flow would be used to build cash stock 
and reduce leverage rather than using it for investments. Moreover, the adjustment cost 
hypothesis postulates that higher level of adjustment cost associated with R&D investment 
may discourage managers from making R&D investment (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994; 
Sasaki, 2016).  Although, this study has found a negative relationship between 
contemporaneous cash flow and R&D investment, a statistically significant positive 
relationship has been found between lagged value of cash flow and R&D investment. This 
again laid support to adjustment cost hypothesis which states that due to the high adjustment 
costs related to R&D investment, firms tend not to make R&D investment based on 
contemporaneous cash flow rather firms depend on permanent increase in cash flow to make 
R&D investment (Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994). Sasaki (2016) also pointed out that if the 
future outlook of cash flow is not promising then managers do not tend to make R&D 
investments. However, the author pointed out that if managers find out that the increase in 
cash flow is permanent in nature, then managers become encouraged to make R&D 
investment. Himmelberg and Petersen (1994) concluded that R&D investment responds to 
changes in permanent cash flow rather than changes in transitional cash flow. Brown et al. 
(2009), Brown et al. (2012), and Sasaki (2016) have found evidence on the positive 
relationship between lagged value of cash flow and R&D investment.  
Although GDP growth is higher in emerging markets, contrary to the accelerated principle, it 
is uncorrelated with R&D expenditure. This is because emerging countries spend their 
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income on infrastructural development. Moreover, the recent financial crisis adversely 
affected emerging countries. Based on a study of OECD countries, Wang (2010) also found 
GDP to be a fragile determinant of aggregate R&D. 
5. Elasticity Test: 
Table 6 shows that elasticity test of the variables. Hillier et al., (2011) states that elasticity 
test gives the homogenous base for comparison. Therefore, following Hillier et al. (2011), we 
performed elasticity test to compare the explanatory power of the institutional variables for 
R&D investment. We computed the elasticity based on the following formula: 
𝐸𝑖 = 𝛽𝑖
𝑋𝑖
𝛽𝑝X
 
 
Where I represents the institutional variables, 𝛽𝑖 indicates its coefficient, 𝑋𝑖 is its mean, and 
𝛽𝑝X captures the predicted value of the dependent variable evaluated at the mean of each 
regressor.  
The results show that among the institutional determinants, corruption (Ec= -0.31716) has the 
highest explanatory power followed by regulatory quality (Erq= 0.26148), government 
effectiveness (Ege= 0.22786), rule of law (Erl= 0.20838), and political instability (Epi= -
0.14343). This implies that long term and risky investment like R&D, would be more 
influenced by the level of corruption in emerging markets. This is expected as R&D is more 
of a long term investment and investment in a corrupt country surely indicates that the 
sufferings from that investment would be long term as well. Moreover, as we have mentioned 
earlier that corruption increases information asymmetry and cost of doing business, R&D 
investors would surely be discouraged by the level of corruption in emerging markets. 
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Table 6: Elasticity 
 
Variables Elasticity  
Government effectiveness 
 
0.22786 
Rule of law 
 
0.20838 
Corruption 
 
-0.31716 
Political instability 
 
-0.14343 
Regularity quality 
 
0.26148 
 
 
Source: Author's calculation 
  
6. Robustness Test: 
The robustness of the results has been tested using Ordinary Least Square (OLS)
5
 estimation 
(see Table 7). In order to control for heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation, a cluster-robust 
standard error was used. The key results concerning institutional factors remain unchanged 
except for government effectiveness. In our robustness test, government effectiveness has a 
positive sign but became statistically insignificant. The results also show that rule of law and 
regularity quality are positively related to R&D investment, while corruption and political 
instability affect R&D negatively in our selected emerging markets. It can be seen that the 
results are robust and fully support Hypotheses 2, 3, 4, and 5, while Hypotheses 1 is 
supported but not robustly. However, other variables retain the same sign. 
Table 7: Robustness Test 
R&D intensity  0.86224*** 
 
(0.03406) 
Government effectiveness 0.00044 
 
(0.00097) 
Rule of law 0.00099* 
 
(0.00072) 
Corruption -0.00171* 
 
(0.00094) 
                                                 
5
 We also conducted regression analysis by Tobit estimation. The results are the same as OLS. We also tested the 
multicollinearity among the variables. It is expected that institutional factors to be highly correlated one another due to their 
close connectedness and one could make judgements about the overall quality of a national institution (Tabellini, 2008). The 
pairwise correlations range is from 0.0141 to 0.9362. The results will send upon request. 
1t
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Political instability -0.00082** 
 
(0.00037) 
Regularity quality 0.00212* 
 
(0.00116) 
Firm size 0.00008 
 
(0.00020) 
Cash flow -0.00016*** 
 
(0.00004) 
Cash flow  0.00013*** 
 (0.00003) 
Debt ratio -0.00259** 
 
(0.00096) 
GDP growth 0.00004 
 
(0.00006) 
Industry dummies Yes 
Time dummies Yes 
R-squared 0.8086 
F test 181.90(18) 
                                      Standard errors in parenthesis, Significant Level: * < .10, ** < .05, ***< .01 
 
7. Conclusion 
R&D investment is considered to be one of the most essential elements in promoting 
economic growth and development (OECD, 2015). Therefore, it is important for countries in 
general and emerging markets in particular to continue making R&D investment. It has been 
argued that sound and strong institutions helps to promote R&D investment by ensuring 
better access to finance, less information asymmetry, mitigating the managerial expropriation 
problem and providing better investor protection and reducing transaction cost. Thus, Wu et 
al. (2016) pointed out that the institutional environment may impact R&D activity by 
providing supports or constraints beyond the capacity of an individual firm. Good institutions 
are important to promote R&D across the world but are more important for emerging markets 
as government and societal influences are much stronger in those economies (Hoskisson et 
al., 2000; Kang and Jiang, 2012). This study has examined the institutional determinants of 
R&D expenditure using panel data from 20 emerging countries for the period 2006-2013. 
Using GMM estimation method, the study has found that a set of selected institutional factors 
1t
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have significant influence on the level of R&D investment in the selected emerging countries. 
More specifically, results show that government effectiveness, rule of law, and regularity 
quality have significant positive impacts, while corruption and political instability have 
significant negative impacts on R&D investment in emerging countries. Effective 
government and strong law and regulations of a country may stimulate R&D investment by 
facilitating access to finance, ensuring market entry, attracting foreign investors, increasing 
investors’ confidence and protection, and in particular by accelerating technological 
investment. On the other hand, the study has found that corruption and political instability 
have got negative impact on R&D investment. Corruption increases information asymmetry 
and the cost of R&D investment and political instability may discourage both local and 
foreign investors to invest in R&D activities as they increase the risk and uncertainty of 
investment. The results are significant in alternative robustness checks. We also performed 
elasticity test to compare among the institutional factors. The results show that among the 
institutional determinants, corruption has the highest explanatory power followed by 
regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, and political instability. 
The results of this study has important policy implications. A widely accepted view among 
the researchers and practitioners is that innovation is an important constituent of productivity, 
competitiveness and sustainable economic growth (Hottenrott and Peters, 2012). However, 
emerging markets are not being able to attract sufficient level of R&D investment 
commensurate with their growth prospect. Only few among the emerging markets are 
successful in promoting R&D investment and the rest are struggling to maintain the pace 
(Howells, 2008). To overcome the problem of underinvestment in R&D, we have to be aware 
of various firm level and institutional determinants so that appropriate policy can be 
formulated to promote R&D investment. It has been argued that country level determinants 
like institutional factors are more important than firm level factors as institutions can explain 
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larger aggregate trends from period to period whereas firm-level factors only explains some 
variance within the period (Pattit et al. 2012). Therefore, policy makers from emerging 
markets should focus more on institutional factors to formulate appropriate policy to enhance 
the R&D investment. It is pertinent to mention that focusing on institutional factors to 
formulate policies would be cost effective as Doidge et al. (2007) pointed out that for 
emerging economies, firm level factors explain almost nothing as the cost of adoption of 
those variables outweighs the benefits. 
This research has shown the importance of the institutional environment for firms’ decision 
making on R&D investment. Due to missing values, some economic and cultural factors that 
might affect firm-level R&D investment were not included in this study. In addition, due to 
missing values, not all emerging markets were included in the analysis. Moreover, primary 
data could have been used for more detail firm level analysis. Further investigation may be 
helpful on other emerging markets using data on firm level institutional factors to 
complement the results of this research. 
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